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INTRODUCTION

In their classic 1952 article The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation,' Professors Blum and Kalven skeptically review the major
arguments for a progressive income tax, one under which the tax rate
* Associate, Cornfield and Feldman, Chicago, Illinois. The author acknowl-

edges with thanks the comments of Richard Friedman, Donald Green and Chris
Wonnell.
1. Walter

J. Blum & Harry Kalven Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive

Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 417 (1952). The article was republished the following

year as a book.
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imposed on income increases as the taxpayer's income increases. 2
Blum and Kalven unequivocally reject every argument for progression
save one. The sole ground on which they believe progression can be
supported is that it reduces economic inequality. They do not, however, completely accept even the egalitarian argument. They ultimately
refuse either to endorse or to condemn progression.
The linchpin of The Uneasy Case is its rejection of the principle
that income has diminishing marginal utility.' Diminishing marginal
utility of income (DMUI) means that the greater a taxpayer's income,
the less an additional dollar of income is worth to him. If DMUI
holds, the government exacts a lesser sacrifice from a higher-income
taxpayer, with each dollar taxed, than from a lower-income taxpayer.
Moreover, any redistribution of income from a higher-income taxpayer to a lower-income taxpayer tends to increase aggregate welfare:
The lower-income taxpayer derives greater utility from each dollar
gained than 4 the higher-income taxpayer derives from each dollar
surrendered.
Progressive taxation has been supported under a number of
theories, not all of them mutually consistent.' The major common
denominator of these theories is that they assume DMUI. 6 In rejecting
DMUI, The Uneasy Case has done a great deal to undermine the
adherence of legal scholars to progression. While many scholars have
display timidity and
continued to advocate progression, they often
7
defensiveness in the face of The Uneasy Case.
2. An income tax under which all pay the same percentage of their income in
tax is a proportional or "flat" tax. An income tax under which the tax rate declines
as income increases is regressive.
3. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 472-79. To a great extent, the diminishing
marginal utility of income is but a specific application of the diminishing marginal
utility of money. However, as the income tax taxes income rather than money, the
more specific formulation is appropriate.
4. This explanation of DMUI contains certain assumptions about the distribution of the capacity to enjoy income. For a discussion of these assumptions, see
infra notes 47-52 and the accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 53-56 and the accompanying text for a summary of these
theories.
6. Indeed, Blum and Kalven speculate that intuitive acceptance of DMUI is
the major reason for the popularity of progression. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1,at
477 n.152.
7. See, e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein, Back From the Dead: How President
Reagan Saved the Income Tax, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 207, 214 (1986) (". . . we
cannot say that the wealthy do not value additional income less than the poor ...");
Boris J. Bittker, Second Lecture, in THE INco ME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT
BE? 34 (Charles 0. Galvin & Boris J. Bittker eds., 1969) ("I do not quarrel with the
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This article contends that Blum and Kalven's conclusions in The
Uneasy Case have been too uncritically accepted. The Uneasy Case
contains serious analytical flaws, particularly in its treatment of
DMUI. There are a number of reasons to believe that DMUI is
correct. These reasons include the manner in which taxpayers rank,
through their preferences, the utility of the income they receive; the
work/leisure habits of taxpayers; the microeconomic principle that
goods consumed have in general diminishing marginal utility; and
introspection as to how changes in income affect one's marginal
valuation of income. As to all such matters, Part I of this Article
contends, Blum and Kalven's analysis is marred by fallacy. Typically,
Blum and Kalven distort the argument for DMUI, thus obscuring
both the force of the argument and the inadequacy of their response.8
Part II of this article explores the relevance of DMUI to tax
policy. It considers how Blum and Kalven's evaluation of the case for
progression would have been different had they accepted DMUI. It
also considers how a rejection of Blum and Kalven's position on
DMUI relates to major recent scholarship 9 that questions the conclusions of The Uneasy Case in areas other than DMUI.
I.
A.

THE UNCONVINCING CASE AGAINST

DMUI

SELF-RANKED INCOME USE

One method of establishing DMUI is to observe that a taxpayer
satisfies his most important wants with the income available to him,
and that any other wants he might satisfy after an increase in income
must necessarily be less important. This might be called the theory of
self-ranked income use. The theory is given a fuller exposition by
Lerner:
Blum-Kalven conclusion that the case for progression is 'uneasy'.. .. An equally
painstaking examination of the case for a proportional rate structure, however, would
in my opinion have ended with the same inconclusive verdict.").
8. Blum and Kalven's objections to DMUI are for the most part theoretical
rather than empirical. I reply in kind. For a summary and discussion of relevant
empirical work, most of which is taken to support DMUI, see Nicholas Stern, The

Marginal Valuation of Income, in STUDIES IN MODERN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 209-54
(M.J. Artis & A.R. Nobay eds., 1977). Subsequent empirical work in expected utility
theory is referenced and discussed in Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational
Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J.Bus. S251 (1986).
9. Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure:

A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905 (1987).
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[C]onsumers spend their income in the way that maximizes
the satisfaction they can derive from the goods obtained. With
a given income, all the things bought give a greater satisfaction
for the money spent on them than any of the other things that
could have been bought in their place but were not bought for
this very reason. From this it follows that if income were
greater the additional things that would be bought with the
increment of income would be things that are rejected when
income is smaller because they give less satisfaction; and if
income were greater still, even less satisfactory things would
be bought. The greater the income the less satisfactory are the
additional things that can be bought with equal increases in
income. 10
Blum and Kalven do not accept the theory of self-ranked income
use. They suggest, for one thing, that the theory cannot be probative,
as to a given taxpayer, if he changes his original pattern of consumption after increasing his income:
The usual statement implies that when a man's income is
increased he continues to spend his original income as before
and simply adds new items of expenditure as a result of the
addition to income ....
But this view oversimplifies the
facts .... The man who at a relatively low income buys and
enjoys a second-hand car usually does not, when his income
increases, merely add a new car to his possessions and also
continue to hold and enjoy the second-hand car as before."
Blum and Kalven are wrong to suppose that a mere change in
original consumption can challenge the theory of self-ranked income
use. The theory does not require a taxpayer to retain his used car
after he has increased his income and bought a new one. All the
theory postulates is that the taxpayer could have bought the new car
at some lower income level but decided not to do so. He decided not
to do so because the satisfactions that the new car would have
displaced - presumably the used car plus a number of other satisfactions - had greater utility than the new car offered. As long as an
increase in income causes the taxpayer to purchase an item that he
previously rejected and that has lower per-dollar utility than the items
he previously purchased, the taxpayer has experienced DMUI. It does
not matter whether the newly-purchased item displaces another, less
expensive item.
10. ABRA P. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL 26-27 (1944).
11. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 475.
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Blum and Kalven do appear to offer another response to the
theory of self-ranked income use. They appear to argue that preferences reverse with increases in income:
It is not plausible that the most important wants of a man
with a $5,000 income remain his most important wants when
he has an income of $25,000. As his income changes his way
of life changes. He becomes in2 effect a man with a different
hierarchy of wants and values.'
The theory of self-ranked income use depends on a correspondence between preferences of diminishing intensity and the income
used to satisfy those preferences. The hypothesis that preferences
reverse with increases in income is thus at least arguably a challenge
to the theory. But it is hard to determine how seriously Blum and
Kalven assert this challenge because it is unclear to what extent they
distinguish between preference reversal and mere changes in original
consumption. As noted, changes in original consumption with increased income are entirely consistent with the theory of self-ranked
income use. Moreover, a change in original consumption does not at
all suggest preference reversal. If after experiencing an increase in
income a taxpayer replaces his second-hand car with a new car, he
has given no indication of preference reversal. Preference reversal has
only occurred if he would now be willing, in order to keep the new
car, to sacrifice whatever satisfactions he could have - but did not
- previously sacrifice to obtain the new car.
Despite Blum and Kalven's failure to draw a clear distinction
between changes in original consumption and preference reversal, one
can assume, for argument's sake, that they do challenge the theory
of self-ranked income use on the ground that preferences reverse with
increases in income. 3 This challenge, when scrutinized, is not very
convincing. First, even if preference reversal accompanies an increase
in income, it need not affect the self-ranking process. It is possible
that the newly-enriched taxpayer does not derive greater per-dollar
utility from the items he now prefers than he did from the items he
previously preferred. It is possible, in other words, that there is no
utility gain, but that the utility of the two sets of items has simply
flipped.
12. Id. at 476.
13. At least one observer, cited by Blum and Kalven, has explicitly denied the
force of the theory on that ground. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 475 n.149
(citing Chapman, The Utility of Income and Progressive Taxation, 23 ECON. J. 25,

32 (1913)).
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In the absence of utility gain, preference reversal is irrelevant. At
whatever income level a taxpayer finds himself, and whatever his
preferences may be, he will spend his money on the things from which
he expects greatest utility and forgo the things from which he expects
4
less utility. Assume that Blum and Kalven's $5,000-income taxpayer
purchases goods M, N, and 0, in order of preference, and forgoes
good P. Assume further that the taxpayer's income increases to
$10,000, whereupon he reverses his preferences and purchases goods
T, S, R, Q, P and 0, in order of preference, and forgoes M and N.
Finally, assume that the taxpayer has experienced no utility gain: He
derives the same satisfaction from his three most-valued goods- T, S,
and R- as he did previously from goods M, N, and 0.
At the higher income, the taxpayer has completely reversed his
preferences. Nevertheless, this wholesale reversal has no implications
for tax policy. The "last" or marginal dollars of the taxpayer's newlyincreased income still have lower utility than the last dollars of his
previous, lower income. Even though he has now forgone the items
he previously valued most, he has still purchased six items (each
valued less than the previous one) as opposed to three. As the taxpayer
has by hypothesis obtained no utility gain merely through the reversal
of preferences, he will experience less loss in utility by surrendering
his sixth purchase than he would had he, at the lower income,
surrendered his third purchase.
Thus, in order to challenge the theory of self-ranked income use,
one must hypothesize that increases in income are accompanied not
only by preference reversal, but by preference reversal with utility
gain. Why, however, should an increase in income lead to preference
reversal with utility gain? Presumably money does not have a metamorphasizing power that operates directly on the pleasure centers of
the brain; some other explanation must be offered.
One conceivable explanation is that increases in income expose a
taxpayer to satisfactions he has not previously experienced. After the
taxpayer experiences the newly-available satisfaction, he discovers that
his previous estimation of it was mistaken. It affords more pleasure
than he expected. Further, had he previously known how pleasing it
would be, he would have sacrificed other satisfactions to obtain it.
His previously revealed preferences were therefore mistaken and ignorant. 51
14. In the interest of elegant archaism I have not altered the hypothetical to
account for inflation.
15. The term ignorant is not used in a pejorative sense; it merely denotes lack
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There is little reason to believe, however, that taxpayers in
contemporary America are massively ignorant in their preferences,
from lack of exposure, and that this ignorance is ameliorated as they
move up the income scale. On the contrary, taxpayers at all income
levels are exposed to the widest possible variety of potential satisfactions. One cause of such universal exposure is of course advertising;
for consumers, as far as
advertisers do their level best to realize
6
possible, every conceivable satisfaction.
It is odd that Blum and Kalven, who demand strict proof of all
that is intuitive about DMUI, should so cavalierly claim great significance, without evidence, for the counter-intuitive hypothesis of preference reversals with utility gain.' 7 Blum and Kalven fail to establish
that preference reversals with utility gain commonly accompany increases in income. They therefore fail to challenge the theory of selfranked income use in any serious way.
B.

UTILITY PATTERNS

Another method of establishing DMUI is to consider what use
taxpayers at various income levels actually make of their income.
Based on experience and observation, it is easy to conclude that the
uses of income that predominate as one moves up the income scale
have diminishing marginal per-dollar utility. This conclusion is actually the inevitable result of self-ranked income use, coupled with the
commonality of taxpayers. If taxpayers had unique tastes, the preferences ranked through successive uses of income could vary randomly
from taxpayer to taxpayer, even given DMUI. One taxpayer could
prefer X to Y and Y to Z and another Z to Y and Y to X. But
because taxpayers have a common biology and culture, they tend to
rank certain types of expenditures as having higher utility and certain
other types of expenditures as having lower utility.
1. Subsistence Income
First, of course, taxpayers will prefer those expenditures that
enable them to survive. Blum and Kalven actually make a limited
of knowledge. For a discussion of how preferences can disserve utility and/or welfare,

see YEw-KWANG No, WELFARE EcoNoMIcs: INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF
BAsIc CONCEPTs 7-12 (1979).
16. It might be ventured that even if taxpayers with lower incomes are exposed
to all possible satisfactions, some satisfactions will be beyond their reach. I address
this point infra at note 32 and the accompanying text.
17. I assume, again, that Blum and Kalven are not merely confusing preference
reversals with changes in consumption.
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exception to their rejection of DMUI to account for this point. If an
individual's income is below "minimum subsistence level," Blum and
Kalven appear to concede, it has higher marginal utility than income
generally." Such a concession is of course necessary: If Blum and
Kalven were to deny that a hundred dollars used to prevent a poor
man from starving has greater utility than a hundred dollars added
to a millionaire's already-ample bank account, their readers would
likely reject their arguments out of hand. 19
However, it is not clear how Blum and Kalven propose to limit
the principle that the satisfaction of certain wants - here, the
preservation of life and all its future satisfactions - can confidently
be assigned greater utility than the satisfaction of other wants. Consider again the hundred dollars of income that will be added to the
millionaire's savings. Does it not have less utility than a hundred
dollars spent to prolong rather than save a poor man's life, on items
such as health care and a healthy diet? If so, does it not also have
less utility than a hundred dollars spent to secure housing? After all,
one can be homeless and still face no substantial danger of imminent
death. And if the hundred dollars added to the millionaire's savings
has less utility than a hundred dollars spent to secure housing, does
it not also have less utility than the same amount expended on
furniture, a television set, a car or even the cost of a child's summer
camp? Perhaps lines can be drawn, but Blum and Kalven's failure to
attempt any such line-drawing is telling.20
2.

Function and Finery

Let us consider the types of expenditures that are commonly
thought to have a relatively low per-dollar utility and that taxpayers
tend to make only when their more important wants are satisfied. 2'
18. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 473.
19. It is possible that Blum and Kalven do not even concede that income
necessary for survival has greater utility than other income; their remarks can be
interpreted to mean that it is unnecessary to valuate the marginal utility of subsistence
income because such income will not in any event be subject to tax. However,
subsistence income is in fact subject to heavy state and social insurance taxes.
Although The Uneasy Case focuses on the federal income tax, as does this article,
one ultimately cannot ignore that other taxes exist.
20. The closest they come is the unamplified statement, later in their article,
that "[olne can always insist that he can draw a distinction at the minimum subsistence
level but that he can draw no further ones among persons above that level." Blum
& Kalven, supra note 1, at 509.
21. The following discussion is by no means exhaustive, but it should indicate
some clearly recognizable utility patterns.
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A significant part of increases in income goes to purchase goods of a
higher quality than those the taxpayer already possesses. Few would
disagree that in general, there is greater utility from the acquisition
of the good itself than from the step-up in quality. To be precise,
there is a greater increase in utility from having no car to having a
car than from having a car to having a luxury car.22
It is fairly easy to conclude, based on common experience, that
improvements in the quality of goods increase utility less than the
acquisition of goods, even if the improvement in quality consumes no
more dollars than the acquisition itself. But improvements in quality
often cost many times more than basic acquisitions. Consider a
taxpayer who owns a $20,000 Chevrolet automobile. After an increase
in income, he decides to buy an $80,000 Mercedes-Benz.23 It has
already been suggested that there is a greater increase in utility from
having no car to having a Chevrolet than from having a Chevrolet to
having a Mercedes-Benz. However, that is not even required. If one
assumes, counter-intuitively, that the step-up in quality is equal in
utility to the acquisition of the good itself, the money spent to
purchase the Mercedes-Benz will still have one-fourth the per-dollar
utility of the money spent to purchase the Chevrolet. The step-up to
the Mercedes-Benz must afford four times greater utility than the
acquisition of the Chevrolet in order to avoid the conclusion that
marginal utility of the money spent for the Mercedes-Benz has diminished.
3.

Higher Quantities

Another use which taxpayers make of increased income is to
purchase more of the same goods already possessed or consumed. It
is a commonly accepted principle of microeconomics that increased
consumption of a particular good is in general subject to a law of
diminishing marginal utility32 Few would be likely to disagree, for
22. One reason why taxpayers experience a greater increase in utility from the
acquisition of basic goods than from improvement in quality is that if so-called
luxury goods possessed features that truly afforded a substantial increase in utility,
there would be a great consumer demand for those features. Consequently, there
would be terrific market incentives for vendors or manufacturers to incorporate those
truly useful features in basic goods as well.
23. One should assume no trade-in value; if there is a trade-in, the money
spent to purchase the Chevrolet also is responsible for obtaining some of the utility
conferred by the Mercedes-Benz.
24. See, e.g., W. BAUMOL & A. BLINDER, MICROECONOMICs 79 (1991); S. CALL
& W. HOLAHA",

MICROECONoMics

32-42 (1980).
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example, that there is a greater increase in utility from having no car
to having one car than from having one car to having two cars.
Blum and Kalven deny that the law of diminishing marginal
utility, applicable to commodities generally, has any relevance to
money. They claim that "[m]oney is infinitely versatile. ' 25 However,
a significant pattern of money use is to purchase an increased quantity
of goods already possessed. If one accepts that a law of diminishing
marginal utility applies to commodities generally, one must also accept
that the money used to purchase commodities having diminished
marginal utility has itself a diminished marginal utility. 26
4.

Savings

The utility patterns just discussed are actually consumption patterns - they demonstrate the diminishing marginal utility of income
that is consumed. Some income, of course, is not consumed, but
saved. Savings patterns, like consumption patterns, reflect DMUI.
They do so by reinforcing the conclusion that income consumed has
diminishing marginal utility and by demonstrating, especially once
that conclusion is accepted, that income saved also has diminishing
marginal utility.
Savings is in a large sense consumption insurance. 27 A major
purpose of savings is to insure to the taxpayer a certain consumption
level against the risk or expectation that the taxpayer's income, other
than from savings, will diminish or disappear. The purpose of insuring
a certain consumption level subsumes, among other things, saving for
retirement.
The widespread interest of taxpayers in insuring a level of consumption, usually one not higher than currently enjoyed, is yet another
indication that income consumed has diminishing marginal utility. If
25. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 474.
26. Blum and Kalven seem to believe that the case for diminishing marginal
utility of particular commodities is stronger than the case for DMUI. To the author
the reverse seems to be true. With successive purchases of the same commodity, there
need not be such a ranking of preferences as always occurs with income use.
27. It is commonly thought that insurance reflects DMUI; it is sometimes
thought, conversely, that gambling reflects increasing marginal utility of income. See
Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56

J. POL. ECON. 279 (1948). In stating that savings is consumption insurance, I am not
of course assuming that consumption has a greater actuarial value than savings in
the same way that a risk has a greater actuarial value than an insurance premium;
rather, I am assuming that immediate gratification, all else equal, is preferred to
delayed gratification.

1992:3731

A CRITIQUE THE UNEASY CASE

income consumed had a constant marginal utility, taxpayers would
have little or no reason to forego current increases in consumption in
order to insure that future consumption remained above a certain
level.2

The distribution of savings among the income classes also tends
to indicate that income consumed has diminishing marginal utility.
As is well known, savings is progressive with income-as taxpayers
move up the income scale, they save a greater and greater percentage
of their incomes.29 For taxpayers at lower income levels, the satisfaction of immediate wants evidently has very great utility; that is why
they do not forego current consumption in order to save. As taxpayers
consumption have
move up the income scale, increases in immediate
30
attractive.
more
less utility, making savings
If one accepts that income consumed has diminishing marginal
utility, it is easy to conclude, as well, that income saved has diminishing marginal utility. Each additional dollar of income saved, if it
contributes at all to future consumption, is likely to contribute to a
higher level of consumption than that which the previous dollar of
income saved would have allowed. Thus, for example, a taxpayer
who saves $10,000 per year for retirement will have available a higher
consumption level, at retirement, than if he had saved only $5,000
per year. As consumption has diminishing marginal per-dollar utility,
the income saved to achieve it also has diminishing marginal utility.
Moreover, the higher a taxpayer's income, the more likely it is
that an additional dollar of income saved will not contribute to future
consumption at all. At some point, for example, the taxpayer's
consumption level will be fully insured, and no further savings will
be necessary for this purpose. 3' The diminishing likelihood that income
28. Another major function of savings is to allow the taxpayer temporarily to
raise his consumption level above his income by, for example, purchasing a car. This

function of savings is of course less and less important as the taxpayer's income
increases.
29. Walter J. Blum, Revisiting the Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 60
TAXES 16, 17 (1982). This effect is the basis for one of the most common arguments
against progressive taxation. Opponents of progressive taxation argue that the economy benefits from a higher savings rate and that redistributing income from higher-

income taxpayers to lower-income taxpayers would reduce the savings rate. Id.

30. It might seem contradictory to argue that when the rich save, it reflects

DMUI and when the poor do not save, it also reflects DMUI. However, for the

poorer taxpayer the alternative to savings is consumption at a low level, which has
high marginal utility, while for the richer taxpayer, the alternative to savings is
consumption at a high level, which has low marginal utility.
31. It might be more accurate here to speak of the diminishing marginal utility
of money, but income is not an unreasonable proxy for money.
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saved will ever contribute to consumption is thus an additional reason
to believe that income saved has diminishing marginal utility.
5.

Impossible PurchaseScenario

One final utility pattern should be noted, as it relates to a
qualification of the theory of self-ranked income use. Theoretically,
self-ranked income use cannot reveal anything about the utility of
expenditures that are completely beyond the taxpayer's reach. Assume
that a taxpayer has a super-subsistence income of $40,000 and that
his consumption cannot rise above his income by credit, savings, or
other means. Such a taxpayer cannot purchase an item that costs
$50,000, no matter how great its utility. It is at least theoretically
possible that the utility of the $50,000 item is higher than that of the
taxpayer's entire super-subsistence income of $40,000.
In the real world, however, taxpayers never assign any such
enormous utility to any expenditure above their income. One does
not see taxpayers sacrificing all of the satisfactions currently purchased
with their super-subsistence income as soon as such a complete
sacrifice makes it possible to purchase an item previously above their
reach.3 2 Even home purchases, which involve perhaps the greatest
common sacrifice by middle-income taxpayers, do not even approach
such a scenario. In practice, therefore, the theory of self-ranked
income use is not much affected by the scenario of the impossible
purchase.
C. WORK/LEISURE SUBSTITUTION

Yet a third approach to DMUI is to consider how the work/
leisure choices of taxpayers reflect their marginal valuation of income.
On this matter Blum and Kalven's analysis is once again grounded in
fallacy. They suggest that if taxpayers all worked the same number
of hours, they would be exhibiting a constant marginal valuation of
income. In fact, constant hours would be an indication of DMUI.
Assume that a taxpayer earning $5 per hour works the same
number of hours as a taxpayer earning $100 per hour. Assume further
32. An exceptional case is related at Matthew 13:45,
45 Again, the kingdom of heaven is like unto a merchant man, seeking
goodly pearls:
46 Who, when he had found one pearl of great price, went and sold all that
he had, and bought it.
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that the poorer taxpayer 33 is subject to a marginal tax rate of 20%,
while the richer taxpayer is subject to a marginal rate of 50%. Under
these circumstances, the after-tax opportunity cost of an hour of
leisure is $50 for the richer taxpayer but only $4 for the poorer
taxpayer. In other words, the richer taxpayer must forego $50 in
order to gain an additional hour of leisure, while the poorer taxpayer
must forego only $4.
If income had a constant marginal utility, the increasing opportunity cost of leisure would lead taxpayers at successively higher
incomes to work successively longer hours. As they by hypothesis do
pattern, the marginal utility of income
not display this behavior
34
evidently diminishes.
Remarkably, Blum and Kalven appear to miss this point; they
appear to believe that the work/leisure choices of taxpayers can only
reveal DMUI if richer taxpayers work fewer hours than poorer
taxpayers:
The argument that the [marginal utility curve for income]
declines asserts that men are less willing to work for an
additional dollar the more money they have; it seeks to explain
this on the grounds that they must therefore value additional
dollars less the more money they have. But ... [i]f willingness
to work more is being measured solely by the time devoted to
work, it does not seem to check with common observation to
contend that the lower income groups work more hours per
day. For one reason or another men in our society at all levels
3
of the income scale seem to work roughly the same amount.
Blum and Kalven here confuse willingness to work for an additional hour with willingness to work for an additional dollar. A richer
taxpayer and a poorer taxpayer who work the same number of hours
cannot be said to value an additional dollar equally because they do
not receive the same number of dollars per hour. Consider again our
two hypothetical taxpayers, one earning an after-tax rate of $50 per
hour and the other earning an after-tax rate of $4 per hour. Their
equal willingness to work for an additional hour would indicate not
that they are equally willing to work for an additional dollar, but
33. In this article the terms rich and poor are used, somewhat loosely, to refer
to the level of one's income rather than the level of one's wealth.
34. There are explanations other than DMUI for why taxpayers might not

respond to the increasing opportunity cost of leisure. As noted infra at notes 37-39
and the accompanying text, however, they are unconvincing.
35. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 474.
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that the richer taxpayer is as willing to work for an additional $50 as
the poorer taxpayer is to work for an additional $4. It would indicate,
consistent with DMUI, that the utility of a $50 increment to the richer
taxpayer approximates the utility of a $4 increment to the poorer
6
taxpayer.1
Let us momentarily retain, unexamined, the assumption that
taxpayers at successively higher incomes do not work successively
longer hours. Is there any way to explain, without reference to DMUI,
why taxpayers would fail thus to respond to the increasing opportunity
cost of leisure? Two such explanations can be advanced, but neither
is convincing.
First, one can posit that higher-income taxpayers fail to work
more not because their marginal valuation of income diminishes but
because their marginal valuation of leisure increases. Blum and Kalven
do suggest that the value of leisure can increase with income: "[T]he
value of leisure must frequently be affected by the amount of money
one has and hence by the capacity to realize various forms of leisure,
such as travel." 37 However, they appear to make this suggestion only
in order to explain why some higher-income taxpayers might choose
to work less. In order to explain why higher-income taxpayers fail to
work more, one would have to argue not only that the value of leisure
increases with income, but that it increases, for the very rich, to an
astronomical level. One would have to argue, for example, that the
taxpayer earning an after-tax rate of $50 per hour values leisure twelve
times more, in dollars of constant marginal utility, than the taxpayer
earning an after-tax rate of $4 per hour. It is doubtful that Blum and
Kalven would care to make such an argument.
Moreover, although income can add to the utility of leisure, it
does not necessarily follow that richer taxpayers must value leisure
more highly, as opposed to work, than do poorer taxpayers. A
countervailing factor may be that the work performed by richer
taxpayers is more pleasant than that performed by poorer taxpayers,
even after accounting for the premium pay some receive precisely
because they do unpleasant work. In other words, work may have a
higher intrinsic utility for richer taxpayers, quite apart from the
income that work produces.

36. It is strange that Blum and Kalven miss this point in the passage abovequoted as they appear to understand it earlier in their article, in their discussion of
the rate at which the marginal utility of income declines. Blum & Kalven, supra note

1, at 463-64.

37. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 474.
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The other way to explain the failure of taxpayers to respond to
the increasing opportunity cost of leisure, without reference to DMUI,
is to posit that work/leisure choices are completely determined by
biological constraints, such as the need for sleep, and by social norms.
This explanation also fails. Certain norms do tend to collapse work/
leisure decisions into a range of social acceptability. However, even
given such norms, tax policy analysts, including Blum and Kalven,
generally do not doubt that there is some substitutability between
concern themselves with the effect of taxes on
work and leisure-they
38
work.
to
incentives
Consider yet again our hypothetical richer taxpayer, the one
earning an effective hourly rate of $100 per hour and facing a 50%
marginal tax rate. The 50% marginal rate has the effect of reducing
for the taxpayer, by 50%, the opportunity cost of an hour of leisure.
If we are concerned that this 50% rate may cause the taxpayer to
substitute leisure for income-producing work, we necessarily believe
that the taxpayer's work/leisure choices are responsive to changes in
the opportunity cost of leisure. A fortiori, then, we cannot believe
that taxpayers would be unresponsive, absent DMUI, to the far greater
differences in the opportunity cost of leisure that arise from differences in effective hourly rates. After all, even though the 50%
marginal rate reduces the richer taxpayer's cost of leisure to $50 per
hour, that cost is still 12 times higher, absent DMUI, than the
opportunity cost of leisure faced by the poorer taxpayer earning an
after-tax rate of $4 per hour.3 9

To the extent that taxpayers at successively higher incomes do
not work successively longer hours, their behavior reflects DMUI.
However, the reverse is not also true. To the extent that taxpayers at
succesively higher incomes do work successively longer hours, their
behavior does not negate DMUI, even if one assumes that the longer
hours are a response to the increasing opportunity cost of leisure.
Assume that the taxpayer earning an after-tax rate of $50 per hour
works longer hours than the taxpayer earning an after-tax rate of $4
38. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 437-39, 469. For a discussion of recent
literature on the effect of taxes on labor supply, see Bankman & Griffith, supra note
9, at 1919-29, 1962-65.
39. Essentially similar to the idea that work/leisure choices are completely
determined by norms is the idea that the marginal utility of leisure becomes so
precipitously high, after leisure hours are reduced to a given total, that the increasing
opportunity cost of leisure has no effect. This idea is likewise contradicted by the
assumption that taxpayers do respond to changes in the opportunity cost of leisure
brought about by the raising or lowering of tax rates.
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per hour. The richer taxpayer might be indicating that he finds leisure
more expensive than does the poorer taxpayer; he is not necessarily
indicating that he finds it twelve times more expensive, in dollars of
constant marginal utility, than does the poorer taxpayer.
A more technical explication of this point is perhaps in order.
Assume that all taxpayers worked exactly the same number of hours.
Such uniformity would suggest that each taxpayer valued equally one
hour's pay or, to put it more generally, that each valued equally any
given percentage increase in his income. This state of affairs is
described by the logarithmic utility function U = In I, or totally
utility equals the natural logarithm of total income. Under this
logarithmic function, a given percentage increase in income - say 10
percent - results always in the same increase in total utility, regardless
of how high or low income may be.
The marginal utility function corresponding to the above-described logarithmic utility function is MU = 1/I. 4 Under this marginal
utility function, as income approaches zero, marginal utility approaches infinity. Conversely, as income approaches infinity, marginal
utility approaches zero. If taxpayers at successively higher incomes
worked successively longer hours, we might conclude that the marginal
utility of income did not in fact decline over so wide a range or at so
rapid a rate. We would not necessarily conclude, however, that the
marginal utility of income was constant; perhaps taxpayers would be
reflecting, by their behavior, some intermediate marginal utility curve.
Let us now consider how realistic is the assumption, evidently
accepted by Blum and Kalven as true for 1952, that taxpayers at
successively higher incomes do not work successively longer hours.
The economist Colin Clark has suggested a universal law, based on
empirical data, that hours of work decrease with increased income. 41
However, Clark's data concern average hours worked in entire societies over different time periods; he does not compare average hours
worked by different income classes in the same time period. It seems
likely that in contemporary America at least some higher income
classes work, on average, longer hours than some lower income

classes. 42

40. WILLIAM E. BEATTY & RONALD W. GAGE, INTRODUCTORY CALCULUS FOR
BUSINESS AND ECONoMIcs 205 (1973).

41. Clark, The Marginal Utility of Income, 25 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 145,
153-59 (1973).
42. Professor Laura Leete-Guy, Dept. of Economics, Case Western Reserve

University, has graciously provided me with the following data on hours worked by
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In evaluating these disparities, one would have to factor out
various constraints on hours worked by lower-income groups, such
as involuntary unemployment and underemployment and the disincentive of employers to allow employees covered by overtime laws to
work more than forty hours per week. In the other direction, one
would also have to factor out the disincentive effect of higher marginal
tax rates and the effect that longer hours themselves have in increasing
income. Despite these and other complicating factors, it is pretty
clear, especially as between the wealthy and the wealthier, that the
work/leisure choices of contemporary Americans do not display the
type of response to the increasing opportunity cost of leisure that one
would expect if income had a constant marginal utility. The key point
is to understand that constancy of hours across income classes reflects
a rather steeply declining marginal utility curve for income, not, as
Blum and Kalven would have it, a constant marginal utility of income.
D.

SPECULATION or EXPERIENCE?

After denying that DMUI can be established through the theory
of self-ranked income use or by observation of work/leisure choices,
Blum and Kalven opine that the only remaining way to establish
DMUI is by "sheer intuition" of how our marginal valuation of
money would change if "we had many times the amount of money
we now have." 43 They acknowledge that most people would probably
expect to value an additional dollar less if their wealth increased
greatly. But they later question the reliability of this conclusion."
As noted above, there are many reasons, aside from sheer intuition, to believe that income has diminishing marginal utility. But
Blum and Kalven even sell intuition short. For a large number of
people, it is not necessary to speculate on how an increased income
would affect their marginal valuation of income; they have experiindividuals in 1989:
Mean Total
Mean Market
Family Income
Hours Worked
Hours Worked
Level
2,023.49
633.25
Less than $15,000
2,426.44
1,217.32
$15,000 to $29,999
2,638.20
1,516.10
$30,000 to $44,999
2,629.80
1,666.24
$45,000 or more
The "total hours" column includes hours spent in household production. Professor
Leete-Guy is co-author of Leete-Guy & Schor, Assessing the Time-Squeeze: Hours
(forthcoming).
- INDUS. REL. Worked in the United States, 1969-1989,
43. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 477.
44. Id. at 478-79.
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enced actual shifts in income, and can gauge the actual effects of
those shifts. The most common phenomenon, of course, is an increase
in income. Most young people experience such an increase, except in
times of depression. There are also a significant number of people
who, because of financial reversals or other reasons, experience a
decrease in income. The evaluation of such shifts is still a form of
introspection, but it is far more reliable than the introspective speculation that Blum and Kalven would count as the sole basis for intuitive
conclusions.
Blum and Kalven concede that most people intuitively believe in
DMUI; they conjecture that such a belief is due to speculation as to
the effect of an increased income.4 5 Is it not likely, however, that the
common belief in DMUI is at least in part due to experience?
The above section on utility patterns4s essentially detailed the
manner in which an individual's experience tends to lead to a belief
in DMUI. The individual reviews his expenditures and concludes that
the items bought with increased income had less utility per dollar than
the items purchased at a lower income. However, the discussion of
utility patterns offered above is by no means exhaustive and describes
experiences that are more significant for some than for others. Thus,
it is good to remember that most adults can directly intuit DMUI or
its negation from experience.
II.

POLICY SIGNIFICANCE OF

DMUI

A. INTERPERSONAL UTILITY COMPARISONS AND THE
ASSUMPTION OF EQUAL CAPACITY TO ENJOY INCOME

The remainder of this article will examine the tax policy significance of DMUI. As a first step in such an examination, it is necessary
to address the issue of interpersonal utility comparisons. The government must be able to make such comparisons if DMUI is to have any
significance at all for tax policy. It is not enough that a taxpayer
derives less utility from a marginal dollar when he has an income of
$50,000 than when he has an income of $25,000. The government
must also be able to assume that a $50,000-income taxpayer derives
less utility from a marginal dollar than a different taxpayer earning
an income of $25,000.
As between these two hypothetical taxpayers, it is theoretically
possible that the richer taxpayer values the 50,000th dollar of his
45. Id. at 477 n.152.

46. See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text.
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income more highly than the poorer taxpayer values the 25,000th
dollar of his income. After all, taxpayers differ in how highly they
value money, and some taxpayers may even have a greater capacity
than others to enjoy the things money can buy. Blum and Kalven in
fact assert that as one cannot properly assume that all taxpayers derive
same amount of income, DMUI has no
the same utility from the
47
policy.
tax
for
relevance
The fallacy of this reasoning is that it is completely proper to
assume equal capacity to enjoy income, even though this assumption
may be false, unless one actually knows that certain taxpayers derive
greater utility from income than others. If it is possible that the richer
taxpayer has, so to speak, a higher marginal utility curve for income,
it is also possible that the poorer taxpayer has a higher curve. Perhaps
if the poorer taxpayer had an income of $50,000, he would value the
50,000th dollar of that income more highly than the richer taxpayer
now values the 25,000th dollar of his own $50,000 income. As Lerner
and others have demonstrated, if the marginal utility of income
diminishes for both taxpayers, and if one is ignorant as to the relative
capacities of the two taxpayers to enjoy income, one must assume
that the richer taxpayer values a marginal dollar of income less than
the poorer taxpayer. 8
This assumption becomes more and more justifiable as the difference in the two taxpayers' incomes increases. It becomes completely
unexceptionable, as a statistical matter, when applied to large classes
of taxpayers. Thus, if DMUI holds for all taxpayers, one can safely
assign a probability of 1.0 to the likelihood that the average valuation
of a marginal dollar is lower for taxpayers earning above $50,000
than for taxpayers earning below $50,000. This conclusion would only
be subject to doubt if it were shown that taxpayers earning above
$50,000 had, on average, a greatly superior capacity to enjoy income
than taxpayers earning below $50,000.
The point that one must assume equal capacity to enjoy income,
absent knowledge to the contrary, has been made on numerous
49
occasions by numerous observers. Blum and Kalven appear either to
misunderstand or to ignore this point, as they make no response to
it. This lack of any response is odd as they themselves quote, in a
50
footnote, one observer's statement of the point.
47. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 476-77.
48. See LERNER, supra note 10, at 28-32; Amartya Sen, On Ignorance and
Equal Distribution, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 1022 (1973); Thomas N. Carver, The
Minimum Sacrifice Theory of Taxation, 19 POL. Sc. Q. 66 (1904).
49. See supra note 48.
50. "The question is not... whether men's wants are equal, but whether there
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Others, notably including Judge Posner, have asserted that the
rich may indeed have a greater capacity to enjoy income than the
poor. Judge Posner hypothesizes that "the people who work hard to
make money and succeed in making it are on average those who value
money the most, having given up other things such as leisure to get
it."" Some check on this idea is provided by the above section on
work/leisure choices. 52 It should be remembered that work/leisure
choices reflect DMUI on an interpersonal level; they suggest that a
taxpayer with a higher income really does value a marginal dollar less
than a different taxpayer with a lower income.
In any event, there are a great many factors, apart from the
desire for income, that determine the actual level of a taxpayer's
income. Even if there is some positive correlation between income
and the capacity to enjoy income, it is hard to believe that such a
correlation could deprive DMUI of policy significance. At most,
perhaps, one would have to construct an interpersonal marginal utility
curve with a more gentle downward slope than the average personal
marginal utility curve.
B.

DMUI AND THE CASE FOR PROGRESSION

Blum and Kalven's too-hasty rejection of DMUI figures largely
in their conclusion that the case for progressive taxation is uneasy.
Most of the arguments in favor of progressive taxation depend on
DMUI. By rejecting DMUI, Blum and Kalven unjustifiably discount
these arguments.
One argument commonly advanced for progression is that the
government should exact from all taxpayers an equal sacrifice.53 This
argument obviously depends on DMUI: If the marginal utility of
income were constant, equal sacrifice would require not progression,
but a lump-sum or "head" tax. A variant of equal sacrifice is
proportional sacrifice, the idea that all taxpayers should sacrifice an
equal proportion of the utility they derive from income. 4 Once again,
is any rule of inequality of wants upon which the apportionment of taxes could be
made with a nearer approximation to the truth ....
Where the chances are even on

both sides, it is safer to assume equality." Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 477

n.154, quoting Carver, supra note 48, at 74-75.
51. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 436 (3d ed. 1986). A
similar viewpoint is expressed in Norman B. Ture, Comments on Tobin, in INCOME

160 (Colin D. Campbell ed., 1977).
52. See supra notes 33-42 and the accompanying text.

REDISTRMUTION

53. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 455-58.
54. Id. at 457-61.
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this argument depends on DMUI: If the marginal utility of income
were constant, proportional sacrifice would not result in progressive
taxation, but in proportional taxation.
At least as important as these two arguments is the utilitarian
case for progressive taxation." Utilitarianism seeks to maximize the
aggregate utility of all individuals in society.5 6 One possible means of
maximizing aggregate utility is to redistribute income, through the tax
system, from those who value it less to those who value it more.
Obviously, however, if the marginal utility of income were constant,
redistribution from the rich to the poor would not necessarily increase
aggregate utility.
Although most of the major arguments for progression depend
on DMUI, none of them is irrefutable even if DMUI is accepted. All
are subject to other reservations, many of which Blum and Kalven
indeed advance. Thus, equal sacrifice results in progression only if
the marginal utility of income diminishes at greater than an inverse
ratio to the increase in income. 7 If a tax of $10,000 on a $100,000income taxpayer occasions less sacrifice than a tax of $1000 on a
$10,000-income taxpayer, equal sacrifice demands progression. If,
however, the sacrifices are identical, equal sacrifice demands proportional taxation.5"
Proportional sacrifice requires weaker assumptions59 about the
marginal utility curve for income. 6° However, it does require some
assumptions as to the nature of the curve, and further presents the
philosophical issue of why taxpayers should sacrifice an equal proportion of their income-generated utility, rather than an equal amount.
Utilitarianism must contend with the efficiency costs of progressive taxation. Prime among these costs is the possible tendency of
higher-income taxpayers to substitute leisure for income-producing

55. Id. at 465-71 (utilitarianism as requiring "minimum sacrifice").
56. For a modern example of an unalloyed utilitarian approach to tax policy,
see Yew-Kwang Ng, Bentham or Bergson? Finite Sensibility, Utility Functions and
Social Welfare Functions, 42 REv. EcON. STUD. 545 (1975).
57. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 458. As noted supra at note 40 and the
accompanying text, the marginal utility function under which the marginal utility of
income diminishes at an inverse ratio to the increase in income is MU = 1/I.
58. And of course, if a $10,000 tax levelled on a $100,000 income occasions
greater sacrifice than a $1000 tax levelled on a $10,000 income, equal sacrifice
demands regression.
59. A weak assumption is one that does not assume very much, that does not
impose very many demands on the data.
60. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 459.
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work when faced with high rates. 6' A utilitarian argument for progression must advance certain weak assumptions about the efficiency
costs of taxation and the rate at which the marginal utility of income
diminishes. 62 However, most observers, including Blum and Kalven,
believe that given DMUI, utilitarianism does require some progression. 63 Probably a more challenging objection to the utilitarian approach is that it gives short shrift to a taxpayer's entitlement to the
income he has earned.
The objections sketched out above to the various theories of
progressive taxation are not insignificant. Nevertheless, the denial of
DMUI -

if successful -

would be the most fundamental and

complete refutation of them all. When one recognizes that Blum and
Kalven have failed successfully to deny DMUI, all these theories gain
additional force.
C.

IT'S EASIER WITH DMUI

It is instructive, for example, to consider how the specific conclusions of The Uneasy Case would be different had Blum and Kalven
accepted DMUI. As noted above, the only ground on which they
believe progression can legitimately be advocated is egalitarianism.6
Blum and Kalven seem drawn to the goal of economic equality for
two reasons. First, they simply see it as a fundamental value; they
quote Henry Simons' statement that "the case for drastic progression
in taxation must be rested on the case against inequality - on the
ethical or aesthetic judgment that the prevailing distribution of wealth
and income reveals a degree ...

of inequality which is distinctly evil

or unlovely." ,65 They also seem drawn to the goal of economic equality
based on a theory of entitlement, not precisely enunciated, under
which those who earn high incomes are not necessarily more deserving
of the money thus earned than poorer taxpayers. 6"
61. See Bankman & Griffith, supra note 9, at 1919-29, 1962-65.
62. After all, if the marginal utility of income diminishes at a very gentle rate,
and if efficiency costs such as work disincentives result in significantly lower production of income, it is theoretically possible for redistribution of income to result in a
loss in aggregate utility.
63. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 468-69, 491.
64. Id. at 486-506.
65. Id. at 488 (quoting HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INcoME TAXATION 18-19
(1938)).
66. Id. at 496-503. A more precise formulation of such a theory of egalitarian
entitlement is offered by Tobin: "Anyone's earning capacity is dependent on a
complex web of interdependence ....
Market prices are probably a good way of

1992:3731

A CRITIQUE THE UNEASY CASE

The egalitarian case for progressive taxation would be strengthened considerably if one accepted the utilitarian conclusion that
greater equality means greater aggregate utility. As noted, Blum and
Kalven concede that if income has diminishing marginal utility, egalitarian redistribution will increase aggregate utility. 67 The only ground
on which they reject the utilitarian argument for redistribution is that
it is "enmeshed in considerations of whether money has a declining
utility." 6 Had Blum and Kalven accepted DMUI, they would have
had strong additional grounds to accept the egalitarian case for
progression.
Moreover, a recognition that more equal distribution of income
entails greater aggregate utility would have blunted the force of many
of Blum and Kalven's doubts about egalitarianism. Such a recognition,
for example, would explain why advocates of progression generally
have not favored more drastic means to achieve equality, such as the
socialization of property. 69 Unlike redistribution through taxation,
any such destruction of the market economy would have dire efficiency consequences, leading to a decrease in aggregate utility. A
utilitarian approach also helps to explain why, as Blum and Kalven
speculate, the issue of lessening inequality might not appear "any less
urgent" if "by a convenient miracle the wealth and output of the
society trebled over night without any changes in its relative distribution among individuals. "70 Even if everyone experienced an increase
in individual utility, it would still be proper to seek further increases
in aggregate utility through the tax system.
If acceptance of DMUI would give Blum and Kalven additional
reasons to support progression on egalitarian grounds, it would also
give them some reason to accept a theory of progression that they
otherwise completely reject: proportional sacrifice. As between proportional sacrifice and equal sacrifice, Blum and Kalven avidly prefer
the former. 7' Moreover, they consider "advocacy of proportionate
allocating resources . . . . What is not justified is the presumption that these prices
are just deserts. It is not unreasonable to attribute part of the national product to

the general social overhead capital and to allocate it as a social dividend for equal
division." J. Tobin, Considerations Regarding Taxation and Inequality, in INCOME
REDISTRIBUTION

131-32 (C. Campbell ed., 1977).

67. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 468, 491.
68. Id. at 491.
69. Id. at 520 ("[T]he perplexity is greatly magnified for those who in the quest
for greater equality are unwilling to argue for radical changes in the fundamental
institutions of the society.").
70. Id. at 490.
71. Id. at 459-60.
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sacrifice on the assumption that the utility of money declines" 72 to be
the most sensible argument for progression apart from egalitarianism.
Their only problem with this argument is that they are not convinced
that the marginal utility of money declines. With this doubt removed,
they would be closer to accepting proportional sacrifice as a justifi73
cation for progression.
D.

A BRIEF LOOK AT A NEW LOOK

A few years ago Professors Bankman and Griffith published
what is perhaps the most important and comprehensive article on
progressive taxation since The Uneasy Case.7 4 Among its other charms,
this article contains an introduction to the field of optimal taxation
which is intelligible to the non-economist.7 5 Optimal tax systems use
complex mathematical models to calculate the rate structure that will
produce maximum welfare under various assumptions as to the determinants of welfare and as to the effect of taxation on behavior. After
a review of optimal tax theory and of other relevant economic
research, Bankman and Griffith conclude that "[biased on what we
know now ... the case for progressive taxation appears to be far less
uneasy than has been claimed." '7 6 Bankman and Griffith do not,
however, address the issue of DMUI. They merely assume, after the
fashion of optimal tax theorists, that income has a diminishing
77
marginal utility.

72. Id. at 489 n.181.
73. Of course, Blum and Kalven may simply be drawn to proportional sacrifice
because if the marginal utility of income does not decline, this theory results in
proportional taxation. However, one should not inquire too deeply into the motivation
behind an author's position, especially when that position advances one's own
argument.
74. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 9.
75. The author can testify to this accomplishment of Bankman and Griffith,
having sampled the optimal tax literature, with considerable bewilderment, before
reading their article. For a recent survey of this literature, see Joel Slemrod, Optimal
Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 157 (1990).
76. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 9, at 1967. The rate structure favored by
Bankman and Griffith, however, bears little resemblance to the graduated rate
structure of the American income tax. Based on the findings of optimal tax theorists,
Bankman and Griffith urge the adoption of a tax system that includes very substantial
cash grants ("demogrants") to all citizens, coupled with a flat rate or even declining
marginal rates.
77. "The assumption that the value of an additional dollar to an individual
declines as the number of dollars he owns increases ... is common in economic
analysis." Bankman & Griffith, supra note 9, at 147.
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DMUI may require no serious defense among economists. It does
require such a defense in the legal literature, however, precisely
because of The Uneasy Case. Indeed, if income had a constant
marginal utility, the optimal tax systems presented by Bankman and
Griffith would demand a regressive income tax.7" This article thus
complements Bankman and Griffith's work by demonstrating that
contrary to protestations in The Uneasy Case, the assumption of
DMUI in tax policy is reasonable.
CONCLUSION

The Uneasy Case has been criticized for placing the burden of
proof on progression while assuming that proportional taxation need
not be justified. 79 This criticism is accurate but does not, in itself,
detract much from the force of Blum and Kalven's argument. If the
case for progression can only avoid disrepute by arrogating to itself
a presumption of favor, that case is weak indeed.
The real problem with The Uneasy Case is its failure to meet or
even ackowledge burdens on issues subsidiary to progression, particularly DMUI. Certain arguments for DMUI are so powerful that
those who would deny DMUI can prevail only by making affirmative
showings. Doubters of DMUI must explain why richer taxpayers do
not work longer hours; they must demonstrate the extent to which
preference reversals with utility gain accompany increases in income;
they must prove that richer taxpayers have a substantially greater
capacity to enjoy income. On these issues and others, Blum and
Kalven fail.
Blum and Kalven concede that DMUI seems intuitively correct.8 0
After scrutinizing their arguments, one must conclude that it seems
correct because it is correct.

78. Under the assumption of constant marginal utility, aggregate welfare would
be reduced by progression and even by a completely proportional tax, as a result of
efficiency costs.
79. See, e.g., Bankman & Griffith, supra note 9, at 1910-15.
80. Blum & Kalven, supra note 1, at 472.

